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Transnational Networks: 
Recognising a Regional Reality 
Overview 
The purpose of this briefing paper is to highlight the importance of 
transnational migratory networks to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. This 
paper focuses on Afghan population movements into Iran, and is part of 
AREU’s ongoing research project into Afghan transnational networks being 
implemented in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. It points to actions that could 
be taken to reduce and eliminate the costs, financial and otherwise, to 
Afghans migrating to Iran, while at the same time ensuring individual and 
state security on both sides of the border. It argues that the Afghan 
government and policymakers need to acknowledge and realise the 
economic potential of regional labour migration for Afghanistan’s future 
growth. 
After the fall of the Taliban and the establishment of the interim administration 
in Afghanistan in December 2001, Afghan refugees have returned in large 
numbers. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) repatriation figures, at the end of January 2005, 2,256,712 
individuals had returned from Pakistan and 767,887 from Iran. Potentially, 
more than one million of the up to four million Afghans who remain in the two 
countries may return home in the next two years. This level of repatriation not 
only shows a degree of confidence in the renascent state, but also reflects 
expectations created by donor pledges to rebuild the country and the 
deterioration of living conditions in the places of refuge. To a lesser degree, it 
has also been affected by the Iranian and Pakistani authorities increasingly 
implementing policies to encourage Afghans to return home since a 
government supported by the international community has been established 
in Kabul. 
Despite the high levels of return to Afghanistan, families and individuals 
continue to move, and it seems unlikely that the back-and-forth movements 
will stop while they constitute a key livelihoods strategy. Many Afghans have 
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been shifting from one place to the next for years – some never returning to 
their place of origin, others only on a temporary basis before deciding to 
return into Iran or Pakistan. Young men in particular, who have not travelled 
before, are still choosing to cross into Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries – 
suggesting that displacement is not only caused by conflict, but that other 
reasons continue to prompt movement to Iran and Pakistan. 
Migration to Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries, and the very significant 
sum of remittances sent home, can be seen not only as a response to war 
and poverty, but also as an efficient livelihoods strategy for households and a 
key contribution to the economy of the country as a whole. There is a clear 
pattern of multidirectional cross-border movements that indicates the 
ongoing, cyclical nature of migration – blurring the boundaries between 
“refugees” and “voluntary” migrants. The concept of a permanent 
resettlement or irreversible displacement does not take into account this 
multidirectional aspect of population movements. Through the continuous 
circulation of people, money and commodities, as well as information, 
Afghans who are spread across a range of locations remain linked: in this 
way transnational networks are constituted by Afghans interacting and 
cooperating with each other across international frontiers. 
This conclusion must be taken into account by policymakers: the repatriation 
of all Afghans living in neighbouring countries is not feasible, and it would 
undoubtedly have a negative impact on the economic reconstruction of the 
country. In formulating an appropriate response to Afghan migration, the 
governments of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, along with the assistance 
community, must: 
• recognise that migration is not only a reaction to war and economic 
hardship, but also a key livelihoods strategy that is likely to continue well 
beyond the UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation programme; 
• establish a bilateral labour migration framework that provides a clear legal 
identity and rights for Afghan labourers in Iran; 
• provide easier access to passports for Afghans; 
• increase awareness of the contribution, both in labour and otherwise, of 
Afghans to the Iranian and Pakistani economy; and 
• in line with international conventions, continue to uphold the refugee 
status and protection of the most vulnerable. 
The concept of a 
permanent 
resettlement or 
irreversible 
displacement 
does not take 
into account the 
multidirectional 
aspect of 
population 
movements. 
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I. Causes of Migration 
Migration as a way of life 
Since 1978, Afghanistan has been torn apart by 
war and civil strife, generating one of the most 
significant population displacements in the 
world. The strategies developed by Afghans 
during these many years cannot be accounted 
for simply by using the definition of “refugee” 
given by the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol, and that of the “labour 
migrant”. Along with endemic 
insecurity, the economic differential 
between Afghanistan and Iran has 
long led Afghans to migrate to their 
neighbouring country to find 
employment and enjoy the benefits 
of a higher income. 
In the 1960s and 70s, with 
industrialisation in Afghanistan 
negligible, there were insufficient 
employment opportunities for the 
newly educated and the growing 
rural populations. The Middle East 
oil boom in 1973 was a catalyst for 
many Afghans to cross into Iran to 
capitalise on increased labour opportunities. 
Remittances to Afghanistan from abroad rose 
in response to the demand for cash, and just 
before the start of the Soviet occupation 
several hundred thousand Afghan migrant 
workers were in Iran.1 
Employment opportunities and relatively higher 
wages, as well as the pursuit of asylum and 
welfare, continue to encourage Afghan men to 
cross the border, despite the difficulties 
Afghans experience in Iran. For many, 
migration has become a way of life: it is now 
highly organised, and the transnational 
networks that have developed to support it are 
a major, even constitutive, element in the 
social, cultural and economic life of Afghans. 
One of the most striking aspects of this 
phenomenon is the significant flow of capital 
remitted to Afghanistan, which is playing a 
crucial role in the reconstruction of the country.2 
                                                 
1 B. Rubin, 2002, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State 
Formation and Collapse in the International System, New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 79. 
2 Migration as a pre-existent and crucial livelihood strategy among 
Afghans has been recognised in previous works by AREU, which 
have stressed the importance of viewing it in a positive light: A. Pain 
and S. Lautze, 2004, Addressing Livelihoods in Afghanistan, Kabul: 
AREU, 32; I. Christoplos, 2004, Out of Step? Agricultural Policy and 
Afghan Livelihoods, Kabul: AREU, 29–31; J. Grace and A. Pain, 
2004, Rethinking Rural Livelihoods in Afghanistan, Kabul: AREU, 
49. 
Population growth 
Although no precise figures are available, the 
population of Afghanistan in the late 1970s was 
estimated at about 15 million, while in 2004 the 
UN quoted it at 29,863,000. The UN also 
estimates that by 2050 Afghanistan’s population 
will have tripled to 97,324,000.3 
Figure 1. Population projections for Afghanistan to 2050 
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs of the UN Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 
Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, 
http://esa.un.org/unpp (accessed 7 March 2005). 
In spite of the war and the extensive Afghan 
diaspora, Afghanistan’s population has increased 
dramatically over the past 25 years, with a high 
proportion of young people (44.7 percent 
between 0 and 14 years).4 In some regions like 
Behsud, the density when recalculated on the 
basis of cultivable land is greater than that of 
Bangladesh.5 The size of land parcels owned by 
individuals continues to decrease with each 
generation, because of inheritance customs that 
stipulate the division of property among the sons 
of a family. At the same time, there has been 
insufficient economic growth in urban centres to 
absorb the increased number of Afghans needing 
work. This has resulted in shifts in wealth, as 
some well-off families lose their primary income 
source (agricultural land, livestock) while some 
enterprising people have set up new businesses. 
                                                 
3 UN, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision Population 
Database, http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp (accessed 7 March 
2005). 
4 52.9 percent 15–64 years; 2.4 percent 65 years and over. 
5 C. Johnson, March 2000, Hazarajat Baseline Study – Interim Report, 
UN Co-ordinator’s Office, 46. 
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The impact of drought and pests 
Rural Afghan families both with and without 
land and livestock have had to adapt their 
livelihoods strategies to deal with the impact of 
drought. Male out-migration in particular 
emerged as a coping strategy in response to 
the effects of drought in the 1970s and again in 
the late 1990s. Though 2003 saw major 
agricultural improvement with record harvests, 
in 2004 Afghans in at least 17 provinces were 
again faced with the effects of the long-lasting 
drought, loss of groundwater, diminished snow 
packs and less rainfall. Besides the lack of 
water – exacerbated by the fact that many 
irrigation facilities were destroyed during 
conflict through military aggression and neglect 
– plant diseases and low-quality seeds have 
further increased crop losses. This situation 
has prompted many men from rural areas, as 
well as former tenants, sharecroppers and 
small landowners from semi-urban areas, to 
leave their places of origin. As one arbab (head 
or representative of a village) in Faryab 
Province indicated, “five hundred men will 
return from Iran, but a thousand might depart,” 
because of the inability of men to provide for 
their families. 
Uneven economic development 
Inequitable economic growth seriously 
undermines Afghanistan’s development, as 
trade opportunities tend to be monopolised by 
the rich and powerful.6 The informal economy 
and the black market account for a large 
proportion of the Afghan economy, while the 
booming drugs trade is controlled by 
commanders who keep farmers under pressure 
to produce.7 Even with some economic growth 
taking place in major cities since the end of the 
Taliban regime, large-scale investment and 
national emergency and development 
programmes have reached different regions in 
Afghanistan unevenly. 
For instance, Herat in western Afghanistan is 
thriving because of its trade with Iran, and the 
related customs income has allowed for major  
                                                 
6 S. Lister and A. Pain, 2004, Trading in Power: The Politics of 
“Free” Markets in Afghanistan. Kabul: AREU. 
7 In 2003, Afghanistan produced 3,600 metric tons of opium and 
provided more than three-quarters of the world’s supply of illicit 
opium and heroin. See UNODC, 2004, 2004 World Drug Report, 59. 
investment in the city’s infrastructure. Although 
employment opportunities remain irregular and 
often insecure, most people (including returnees) 
with connections (wasita) have generally been 
able to find work. A few kilometres outside the 
city’s boundaries, however, overall employment 
opportunities remain limited because of the 
drought, relatively small landholdings and 
population growth, and the fact that no industries 
have been established. Across socioeconomic 
classes and ethnicity, many men from Herat 
continue to depart to seek work in Iran. 
In a small provincial capital such as Maimana, in 
the northwestern province of Faryab, there is a 
lack of regular work for skilled and unskilled 
labourers in industry, construction and trade. 
Those with traditional skills in small local 
industries like leather production face difficulties 
obtaining credit and selling their produce because 
of poor infrastructure, drought, and the impact of 
globalisation. Not even being able to cover the 
needs of its own inhabitants, provincial towns like 
Maimana have little hope of providing 
opportunities for its surrounding rural areas. 
No rule of law 
More than two decades of fighting has not only 
devastated Afghanistan’s infrastructure, it has 
also weakened government institutions and 
resulted in an absence of rule of law in many 
parts of the country. Along with difficult 
socioeconomic conditions, Afghans of all ethnic 
groups continue to experience insecurity due to 
political instability. 
At present, migration to Afghanistan’s 
neighbouring countries is prompted by 
persecution and security-related concerns in only 
a minority of cases, however the levels of 
protection-related departures are still significant 
in some areas. While migration is therefore 
primarily economically driven, motivations may 
overlap and many men still flee their villages 
because of ethnic tensions, and, particularly in 
northern Afghanistan, to avoid forced conscription 
and taxation by some local commanders.
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II. The Migrant Profile
Along with those external social, political, 
economic and environmental causes of 
migration, personal circumstances such as 
gender, age and family composition influence 
the decision to migrate. Recent migration has 
been shown in AREU’s study to be a male 
phenomenon, with both single and married men 
crossing the border into Iran and Pakistan to 
seek employment. 
Networks of protection for families at home 
A family’s integration within networks of support 
will partially determine whether a male member 
is able to seek work elsewhere. Access to 
resources (such as finances, goods and credit) 
from horizontal support networks is available 
when families have sufficient means to be able 
to reciprocate. Only then, or when vertical 
redistribution networks (on the basis of ethnicity 
or other commonalities) provide sufficient 
protection, can men depart with the knowledge 
that the remaining members of their families 
are taken care of. Contemporary labour 
migration cuts across all socioeconomic 
classes and ethnic groups: daily labourers, 
small traders, sharecroppers, tenants and small 
landlords are all among those making their way 
to Iran to seek work. 
Age and marital status of migrants 
Men who migrate are mostly those who are 
able-bodied and physically strong – in their 
teens, twenties, thirties and early forties. Single 
men often seek work abroad to save for a 
dowry as well as to provide for their parents 
and siblings at home; husbands go in order to 
send remittances to cover the basic needs of 
their family. 
For young men, migration is sometimes a “rite 
of passage” in which they are able to live 
independently and prove themselves as adults. 
They usually go to Iran once before they marry, 
so that they can save something for wedding 
expenses and gain some experience of living 
away from the parental home. The first stay in 
Iran is often the longest (sometimes up to four, 
five or even more years), while married men 
tend to leave for two years at the most. 
Composition of the family 
Many families try to always have one of their 
men in Iran as a means of ongoing financial 
support. It is age and marital status, but also 
the composition of the household, that 
determines who migrates: if a father is too old 
or ill then he will stay behind, and if a family has 
only one son it is unlikely that he will be allowed 
to leave for Iran. Husbands in their twenties, 
thirties and possibly early forties commonly 
migrate, along with single or engaged men in 
their teens or early twenties – not necessarily 
the oldest sons, but the oldest unmarried ones. 
In exceptional cases a wife or mother is left 
behind without male protection, but mostly one 
of her male relatives will provide the necessary 
care. There is often a migratory cycle among 
brothers: a man leaves for Iran; after two or 
three years one of his brothers joins him and 
benefits from his experiences and contacts; 
they stay together for a few weeks or months; 
then the first one goes back to Afghanistan, 
and the cycle continues. 
Who is deciding? 
Household decisions about migration are made 
within the context of broader domestic 
strategies. In some cases, adult men will make 
their own decision to migrate, but most often 
the decision will involve either the father or the 
brothers. Brothers and cousins, and sometimes 
more distant relations and neighbours, will help 
each other and possibly fund the journey to 
Iran. The presence of friends and relations 
abroad will then influence the ultimate 
destination of the migrant. 
There are different trends in the decisions of 
young men to migrate: most obtain the consent 
of their parents before leaving, while some are 
requested to go by their family for particular 
reasons, such as the prospect of forced 
conscription. In some cases, adolescents leave 
in groups without informing their parents – most 
often because they have been deceived by a 
smuggler who lures them with the prospect of 
high salaries and a luxurious lifestyle. 
The role of women in deciding whether an 
adolescent migrates is not usually 
acknowledged in public. While it is assumed 
that married men make all the household 
decisions, women – especially mothers, where 
adolescent boys are concerned – may strongly 
influence the decision-making process. 
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III. Smuggling Networks and Ways of  
Entering Iran 
The large majority of Afghans travelling to Iran 
resort to using smugglers to guide them across 
the border. In western Afghanistan the two 
formal border crossings, namely Islam Qala in 
Herat province and Zaranj in Nimroz, are for 
this reason avoided. Moreover, people-
smuggling routes constantly adapt to changing 
circumstances; currently most routes run 
through the provinces of Farah and Nimroz in 
southwestern Afghanistan. 
Functions of smugglers  
Smugglers organise the crossing of the border 
between Afghanistan and Iran. They also 
facilitate the maintenance of social ties over a 
vast geographical area, playing a vital role in 
the transnational networks of people scattered 
throughout different countries. The smuggling 
networks are diverse, and so are those 
occupying positions within these structures. 
While some experienced migrants start out by 
themselves to reduce the costs of hiring a 
smuggler at the beginning of the journey, most 
end up becoming part of a group of up to 20 
people. A guide from the same region normally 
accompanies them and works as an 
intermediary to get in touch with the people 
smuggler (generally a local Baluch or Pashtun) 
who organises the crossing of the international 
border, then hands the group over to another 
smuggler in Iran. This initial guide can be a 
relative or a neighbour from the place of origin; 
if so, he is more likely to take on additional 
functions such as providing credit, facilitating 
employment, acting as remittance specialist or 
messenger – especially if he accompanies the 
group all the way to the city of destination in 
Iran. An experienced migrant, who might 
receive a tip for his additional responsibility, or 
a representative of a group of relatives, 
sometimes takes on this guidance function. 
Ethnicity, place of origin, and personal 
recommendations are of overriding importance 
in the selection of a guide before getting to the 
Baluch territories in southern Afghanistan, 
especially when the migrants are 
inexperienced. Collaboration with other 
smuggling networks takes place to provide the 
necessary protection and guidance: taxi 
drivers, for instance, can introduce migrants to 
smugglers (thereby increasing the costs). 
Crossing the Iranian border is the most 
dangerous part of the journey, as a patrol can 
always intercept the convoy. The migrants are 
most commonly led by a Baluch smuggler who 
takes them across the frontier on foot. They are 
then taken to their final destination in vehicles 
provided by the smuggler, who handles the 
delicate relations with Iranian police along the 
way. The risks are high, although the 
checkpoints thin out as they move west. At 
each checkpoint it may be necessary to pay 
bribes, and it is always possible that the 
policemen or soldiers refuse the money and 
intern everyone in a camp before expelling 
them from the country. 
Passport politics 
Since the fall of the Taliban, an increasing 
number of migrants have been able to get a 
passport and a visa to go to Iran – although the 
majority continue to cross the border illegally. 
The official cost of a passport is 1,160 afghani 
(US$23.20), yet many end up paying more 
because of the lack of information about formal 
passport prices and the huge inflation of costs 
caused by corruption. The same applies to the 
process of obtaining an Iranian visa, with 
official prices ranging from US$30 for a tourist 
visa to US$90 for a business visa. 
Getting a passport through the formal 
procedures is time-consuming, and requires 
that the applicant possess an Afghan identity 
card or some other documentation proving his 
existence – which the large majority of Afghans 
do not have because of difficulties associated 
with the many years of conflict. Other obstacles 
to accessing passports include not having the 
cash nor the time to cover the necessary 
bribes, lodging and travel expenses if the 
province of origin does not have a functioning 
passport section in the local government (as is 
the case in Maimana). For those applicants 
without connections, there is often 
discrimination towards those from neighbouring 
provinces in the seven provincial capitals in 
which passports can be issued. 
As a consequence of these difficulties, many 
would-be migrants obtain their passports 
illegally. Herat, like other main cities, has a 
thriving black market in which both new and 
used passports can be bought. Criminal 
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networks are able to exploit already poor men 
who plan to go to Iran, causing them to enter 
significant debts in exchange for false 
passports. In 2004, it was said that villagers in 
one area in Faryab were buying illegal 
passports for 15,000 afghani (US$300), which 
is almost 13 times the official price. 
Deportation of illegal Afghan immigrants 
Contrary to the intention of the Iranian 
government, the arrest and imprisonment of 
smugglers and illegal migrants fails to curb 
migration. Deportation stops a few Afghans 
from returning, but despite these examples of 
“failed” migrants, the majority will continue 
attempting to cross the border to find 
employment. Smuggling networks will remain in 
demand as long as the causes of departure, 
and the challenges around access to 
passports, are not addressed. 
Deportations from Iran take place at the two 
formal border crossings in western Afghanistan: 
in Islam Qala a total of 26,732 Afghans were 
deported in 2002, and 28,311 in 2003. 
Deportees are mostly single men, with the 
majority picked up at the border or on their way 
to cities, and a smaller percentage arrested 
during ”round-ups” in major urban centres in 
Iran. An increase in deportations has occurred 
since the passing of the Iranian government’s 
deadline for all unregistered Afghans to leave 
the country by the end of August 2002.8 
Many Afghans return to Iran after being 
deported, in particular if the arrest has occurred 
immediately after entering the country. At this 
stage, migrants have not incurred any major 
costs (except psychologically and emotionally) 
as smugglers are often paid upon arrival. 
Deportees are also more inclined to try re-
entering Iran to avoid returning home without 
having been able to send promised or expected 
remittances. For some men, however, the 
experience of deportation, which can include 
physical violence by Iranian police and forced 
labour, is so traumatic that they avoid ever 
having to go through it again. 
                                                 
8 
UNHCR Herat, 2004, Unaccompanied Minor Deportation 
Analyses 2002–2003, Protection Section, Herat: UNHCR. 
Travel costs 
The costs of getting to Iran are not only 
financial but can be emotional, in particular 
when deportation occurs or when smuggling 
enters the realm of trafficking – in which 
coercion, deception and exploitation 
characterise the travel and the period after 
arrival. If the migrant does not have any fellow 
travellers at the time of departure, nor support 
networks upon arrival, his vulnerability to 
exploitation is much greater. 
The estimated cost of the trip from Faryab to 
Iran – including vehicle rent, commissions and 
bribes – is around US$300, while the shorter 
journey from Herat averages US$150–200. 
Experienced travellers, or those who are 
guided by a relative, are said to pay much less 
(US$30–60). Most commonly the journey’s 
expenses are covered by a relative of the 
migrant, a brother or a cousin, who is already in 
Iran and had been given advance notice. 
Migrants are not released by the smugglers 
until the debt is paid, and if it needs to be 
earned in Iran by the migrant himself, it will take 
a minimum of two to three months’ unskilled 
construction work. 
Without any form of social security once 
working, the costs and risks for Afghan 
migrants are significant. The lack of legal 
identity, labour contracts and insurance 
exacerbate migrants’ vulnerability, especially in 
the case of illness or injury. If forced to stop 
working, ill or injured migrants cannot afford 
health care and are likely to return to 
Afghanistan unless financial support is received 
from relatives or acquaintances. Moreover, 
migrants experience difficulties in accessing 
justice mechanisms in a context in which they 
already face discrimination, and in which they 
are often used as scapegoats in criminal cases. 
The emotional costs are apparent: many 
migrants experience a high degree of stress 
because of the risks of deportation, illness or 
injury, and legal problems – all of which is 
intensified by being away from their families. 
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IV. The Informal Labour Market in Iran 
Functions of transnational Afghan networks 
Afghan labour migrants, partially because they 
come without their families, are able to move 
around relatively easily in Iran, receiving 
support from their relatives, neighbours, 
smugglers, remittance specialists (hawaladars) 
and employers (who provide work, 
accommodation and are likely to maintain 
working relations with Iranian authorities). At 
the same time, there is a fine line between 
assistance and exploitation of Afghans – 
among each other, between migrants and 
smugglers, or between Iranians and Afghans, 
as in the case of employers liaising with 
smugglers at the cost of labourers. 
Ideally, relatives or friends in the different 
neighbourhoods of the migrants’ arrival in Iran 
provide the initial care for new arrivals. They 
lend the money to pay the smuggler, offer a 
place to stay for the first couple of nights, and 
possibly make introductions to potential 
employers. The availability of acquaintances 
offers support and much-needed protection 
from incorporation into smugglers’ exploitative 
networks. Besides networks of relatives and 
neighbours, roommates, who often tend to be 
from the same ethnic group or place of origin, 
can become a close-knit unit, providing 
company and assistance wherever needed in a 
country foreign to all of them. They share 
household responsibilities such as cooking, 
cleaning and washing, and in cases of illness 
they take each other to hospital. 
Afghans’ social networks in Iran function as 
sources of solidarity, credit, information on 
culture and practice in Iran, contacts with the 
labour market, and providers of initial 
accommodation as well as social and emotional 
support. These networks can be based on 
family connections, ethnic identity or 
acquaintances from the area of origin. 
Smugglers sometimes play an integral part in 
these networks, ensuring that money and news 
are brought to and from the migrant’s home in 
Afghanistan, although the latter function is 
becoming less important with the use of mobile 
and satellite phones. 
Iranian migration policy 
In the 1980s, when Iranian authorities were 
focused on Islamic solidarity, Afghans were 
better accepted in the social fabric of their host 
country. Especially during the war against Iraq 
and the ensuing reconstruction, Iran needed 
Afghan workers – even though the government 
wanted to avoid a Pakistan-type situation in 
which Afghans monopolised some sectors of 
the national economy. 
Since the US-led international coalition forces 
intervened in Afghanistan causing the fall of the 
Taliban in late 2001, the living conditions of 
Afghans in Iran have deteriorated, especially 
for families. Increasingly the Iranian authorities 
are trying to limit their number, arguing that 
their home country is now peaceful. Regulation 
of the labour market became stricter, and 
building sites and factories hiring illegal Afghan 
workers are fined severely. Education and 
health services welfare, which were previously 
available to Afghans in Iran, have been 
progressively withdrawn. 
The informal labour market 
In practice, most migrants, despite varying 
causes of departure and aspirations, become 
labourers in Iran. Afghans are primarily 
employed as unskilled workers (the most 
common employment opportunities are 
construction work, digging ditches and 
agricultural jobs) while they find that many 
activities are forbidden to them (for instance, 
they are not allowed to open a shop). Migrants 
from some rural areas have established a 
pattern of first taking on agricultural work before 
moving on to other, better paid, jobs in 
construction. Irrespective of the kind of work, the 
jobs Afghans do in Iran are uninspiring and 
physically demanding. 
Afghan workers are constantly moving around 
from one building site to the next. In this context, 
employment networks play a key role, and 
enterprising and competent individuals may be 
promoted to take charge of a work team. The 
foreman is usually an Afghan himself and is 
responsible for the hiring of workers. The Iranian 
employer allows him considerable leeway and, 
as long as things are running smoothly, does 
little to intervene in the everyday organisation of 
work. The workers form temporary groups 
around a central leader, and it is the relationship 
of each individual with that figure which is 
critical. The members of the team are not 
necessarily related through existing networks, 
since the sources of their relationships with the 
foreman may be diverse: paternal kinship, 
maternal kinship, kinship through marriage, 
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neighbourhood circles in the village of origin, 
and so on. 
Afghan labourers in the context of the 
Iranian economy 
Iranians have a mixed feeling towards Afghans. 
On one hand, the media periodically points 
them out as being a cause of insecurity and 
taking employment opportunities from Iranians, 
even if the evidence for this is weak. But on the 
other hand, as the migrants mostly work 
outside the realms of official state 
administration, they constitute a flexible, cheap 
and highly productive labour source that is 
beneficial to the Iranian economy. It appears 
that many employers are prepared, therefore, 
to protect, stand guarantee and bail out their 
employees when they face problems with local 
and national authorities. 
Iran’s Afghan policy needs to be considered in 
the context of the country’s string of economic 
collapses and modest upturns. The informal 
labour market has continued to develop 
strongly in spite of, or because of, these crises, 
and it is in this sector that Afghans have 
managed to create a niche for themselves. 
Despite its high levels of unemployment, the 
Iranian economy needs the help of these 
immigrant workers, who put up with low wages 
and have a reputation for hard work. In 1994–
95, for instance, their labour contributed 4.4% 
to the Iranian GNP – a sum of several billion 
dollars. Furthermore, money is sometimes 
spent on jewellery and other presents to take  
home to families in Afghanistan. Informal labour 
as well as expenditure patterns of Afghan 
migrants clearly contribute to the Iranian 
economy, though the full extent of this has not 
yet been studied. 
Length and patterns of stay 
Seasonal patterns of economic activity in both 
Iran and Afghanistan partially determine the 
departure and return of migrants. In spring, the 
need to cultivate the land draws more men of 
rural origin to their home areas, while in 
summer the number of travellers to Iran 
increases after the harvest, when no other work 
is available. In autumn and winter, migrants are 
more inclined to go home because of the 
decline in available construction work. 
However, other factors come into play as well, 
determined by family demands and major 
lifecycle events such as weddings. 
A migrant is more likely to stay away longer 
when he is single. The first stay in Iran is often 
the longest (sometimes up to four, five or even 
more years), while married men tend to stay no 
more than two years at a time. In semi-urban 
Herat, unmarried men tended to stay for more 
than a year, while husbands opted for shorter 
trips, with some migrating annually or 
biannually. As it is more expensive and risky to 
travel to Iran than to Pakistan (where some 
Afghans go on a seasonal base for only a few 
months at a time), migrants tend to stay longer 
in Iran. 
V.  Income, Expenditure and Savings 
Income and savings 
Salaries are based on either daily rates or 
piecework, with the amount paid dependent on 
the kind of work, and the age and skill of the 
worker. Wages in Iran are at least twice those 
of a labourer in Afghanistan. An unskilled 
construction labourer can earn around 5,000–
7,000 tomans (US$5–7) per day and a skilled 
labourer around 8,000–10,000 tomans (US$8–
10); while a daily wage worker in Afghanistan 
earns 100–150 Afghanis (US$2–3) per day and 
a skilled labourer around 300 Afghanis (US$6), 
along with a greater degree of irregularity in 
work opportunities. 
Migrants can save a relatively high proportion 
of their wage, as they only spend about 1,000 
tomans per day on food and other basic needs. 
On average, depending on the migrant’s 
income and life expenses, about 70–80 percent 
of their income can be remitted to Afghanistan. 
Remittances 
Remittance flows are a critical source of 
external funding for developing countries. They 
augment households’ income and increase the 
recipient country’s foreign exchange reserves. 
In particular, when unskilled workers emigrate, 
the gain for their country of origin is clear: 
spending on consumption and investment 
generates positive effects; families are 
sustained; further depletion of assets is halted; 
and in some cases there is accumulation of 
assets. 
In Afghanistan, remittances and savings from 
Iran constitute a significant way of providing for 
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the basic needs of relatives staying at home, by 
directly enhancing their purchasing power and 
by covering debts that have been contracted in 
Afghanistan, as well as by repaying the larger 
investment made in sending one of its sons to 
Iran. Remittances are used for social reasons 
(dowries and weddings, alms for the needy and 
votive gifts such as a meal offered to relatives 
and neighbours); for household consumption 
(food, clothes, medicines); for investment (land, 
houses, cars); and increasingly – with the 
relative improvement of security in Afghanistan 
– to start a business (shop, workshop, transport 
vehicle). 
The money is often sent to the head of the 
household, which is the father in those cases 
where the migrant is single. In other instances, 
the money is directly sent to the migrant’s wife 
or mother (not only if she is a widow) or the 
oldest brother if the father has died. Sometimes 
the amount is split and sent to different 
members of the same household. The average 
amount of remittances is US$500–1,200 per 
year, while one mason indicated that he was 
able to remit US$2,000 in one year. On 
average, remittances are sent four to six times 
a year, with a higher frequency for the 
provinces bordering Iran.9 
In sum, remittances sustain families in their 
place of origin, and, in some instances when 
migrants have returned from displacement 
elsewhere, allow for sustainable reintegration. 
For most Afghans, migration is a coping 
strategy to maintain and diversify their assets, 
but also the corresponding money transfers 
play a crucial role in producing and reproducing 
social relations as they are the main means by 
which dispersed family members keep in 
contact and cooperate. Even debts may be 
seen as mechanisms of reciprocity – not only 
covering financial, economic and social needs, 
but also strengthening and maintaining social 
networks within and across borders. 
The hawala system: costs and benefits 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
media has taken a new interest in the hawala 
system – all too often stressing the uses that 
terrorist networks have made of it. Although its 
boundaries may not be clear to the outsider, 
the money transfer system established by 
Afghan migrants must not be simply equated 
with international smuggling and money 
laundering networks. Such a viewpoint is 
inappropriate, because it discredits a practice 
that has limited the humanitarian disaster in 
Afghanistan. Operating outside of the control of 
both the Iranian and Afghan states, the informal 
hawala system is known for its efficiency in the 
absence of formal banking alternatives.  
Remittance specialists, or hawaladars, provide 
a reliable, convenient, and cost-effective 
system of making international and domestic 
payments.10 The cost of money transfers 
through the hawala system and other informal 
money-transfer channels is generally lower 
than through formal channels; the system is 
                                                 
9 Estimates are based on remittance figures of migrants who have 
spent at least a year in Iran. If only one sum was remitted, or if the 
time period was not specified, then this figure was not used in 
calculating the average amount. Furthermore, some estimates 
might have been on the high side, possibly resulting in an inflated 
average estimate of annual remittances. See also Monsutti, 2005, 
War and Migration: Social Networks and Economic Strategies of the 
Hazaras of Afghanistan, New York & London: Routledge. 
10 S.M. Maimbo, 2003, The money exchange dealers of Kabul: a 
study of the hawala system in Afghanistan, Working paper no. 13, 
Washington DC: The World Bank, 1. 
Official cost of passport  1,160 Afs (US$23) 
Cost of passport quoted  
in rural Faryab 
 15,000 Afs (US$300) 
Cost of Iranian tourist visa  US$30 
Cost of Iranian business 
visa 
 US$90 
Smugglers’ charges for 
travel from Faryab to Iran 
 
US$300 
 
Smugglers’ charges for 
travel from Herat to Iran 
 US$150–$200, or for 
experienced 
travellers it can be 
much less (US$30–
60) 
Daily wages in  
Afghanistan 
 
Unskilled: 100–150 
Afs (US$2–3) 
Skilled: 300 Afs 
(US$6) 
Daily wages in Iran  Unskilled: 5,000–
7,000 tomans 
(US$5–7) 
Skilled: 8,000–
10,000 tomans 
(US$8–10) 
Hawala commission  3% 
Hawala commission 
through smuggler 
 5% 
Annual remittances from 
Iran 
 
US$500–1,200  
(70–80% of income) 
Table 1. Costs, wages and remittances for 
migrants in Iran 
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therefore of benefit to those who occupy the 
lower echelons of Afghan society. 
In 2004, hawaladars charged 3,000 tomans per 
100,000 tomans (equivalent to a 3 percent 
commission) for transferring money from Iran to 
Afghanistan, while other channels such as 
smugglers sometimes charged even less. In 
Iran, some individuals were said to charge 
migrants the higher commission rate of 5 
percent, acting as an intermediary between the 
migrant and the hawaladar and thereby 
increasing the costs to the labour migrant. 
Instances of swindlers posing as hawaladar 
have been reported. Despite the many 
advantages of this informal money transfer 
system, the fact that it remains outside official 
channels results not only in a fiscal loss for the 
states but also the potential for abuse of the 
system and loss for migrants. 
Some estimates suggest that in the 1970s, 
Afghans working in Iran or the Gulf states sent 
home $100–$300 million per year. This flow of 
money, already far from insignificant, sharply 
increased in both absolute and relative terms 
during the more than 20 years of war. The 
hawala system has enabled many families to 
feed themselves, and remittances are 
considerably larger, and much better 
distributed, than the total sum of humanitarian 
aid. The social dimension of the money 
transfers may also be highly significant, as they 
play a crucial role in maintaining and 
developing social relations despite the 
prevailing dispersion and insecurity. 
VI. The Way Forward: Migration as a Key 
Livelihoods Strategy 
Migration is not only a response to war, 
insecurity and poverty, it is also a positive 
livelihoods strategy. It is therefore critical not to 
think of this phenomenon as transitory or 
temporary. Transnational networks and the 
remittance system established by Afghans are 
of practical importance for the policies of 
government, neighbouring countries and the 
assistance community. They play an under-
appreciated but crucial role in the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan, and no attempt 
to rebuild the country sustainably can afford to 
ignore them. 
The people of Afghanistan have shown proof of 
inventiveness and dynamism in their 
development of effective social strategies in the 
face of conflict and economic hardship. 
Migrants actively contribute to the livelihood of 
their families and to the reconstruction of their 
home country. More generally, the system of 
migration and remittances makes it possible for 
geographically dispersed networks to maintain 
strong social relations. 
Afghan movement blurs the boundary between 
forced and voluntary migration, as the social 
strategies of people labelled as refugees and 
those of economic migrants are sometimes 
very similar. There is a very real necessity to 
look beyond the three solutions to the refugee 
problems recommended and promoted by 
UNHCR: voluntary repatriation to the country of 
origin, integration in the host country or 
resettlement in a third country. 
Without denying the importance of protecting 
and assisting the most vulnerable people, a 
more comprehensive solution is urgently 
required – one that takes into account the 
strategies developed by the Afghan population 
in which people move back and forth between 
Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries. 
Even if the causes of migration are addressed 
to the greatest extent possible in Afghanistan, 
and the Government of Afghanistan is able to 
gradually provide more effective, authoritative 
and democratic guidance, migration will 
undoubtedly continue because of population 
growth, the underdevelopment of the country, 
persistent lack of rule of law, and potential 
natural disasters, as well as corresponding 
demands of the neighbouring countries’ 
economies. 
To eliminate the costs – financial and otherwise 
– to Afghan migrants who seek work in Iran, 
while ensuring both individual and state 
security, the following recommendations are 
made. 
• The issue of Afghans migrating to seek 
labour elsewhere should be recognised by 
both the government and the assistance 
community as a key livelihoods strategy, 
and an important factor in the 
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reconstruction of Afghanistan as a whole. 
Despite changing political and economic 
conditions, migration persists as a 
consequence of many years of conflict and 
drought, and it will continue to do so in the 
foreseeable future. 
• A continued strengthening of bilateral 
relations between Afghanistan and Iran 
should include the establishment of a legal 
labour migration framework and an 
increased presence of the Afghan 
government in Iran (including the 
involvement of the Afghan Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs). Such a 
framework should facilitate formal labour 
migration and provide a clear legal identity 
and legal rights for labourers. There should 
be a policy shift from limiting migration to 
managing migration – with both 
governments reaping the shared benefits of 
greater international labour mobility, and 
avoiding the negative effects of people 
smuggling and corruption. 
• The Afghan government must improve the 
transparency of its administration and 
ensure increased access to passports able 
to be obtained formally, without bribes. 
• An increased awareness of the 
contribution, both in labour and otherwise, 
of Afghans to the Iranian economy would 
help to reduce discrimination against 
Afghans in Iran. 
• Although the case of Afghans migrating to 
their neighbouring countries tends to blur 
the boundaries between what is 
internationally recognised as “refugee 
status” and labour migration, it is critical to 
remember that there are still vulnerable 
people who need to be protected and 
assisted. In line with international 
conventions, refugee protection must be 
upheld, and a screening mechanism for 
potential refugees must be established.
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